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GEOGRAPHICALLY SEXUAL?: ADVANCING LESBLAN 
AND GAY INTERESTS THROUGH PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION 
Darren Rosenblum* 
Introduction 
In the 1993 New Yoric City School Board elections, a system of 
proportional representation1 allowed lesbians and gay men2 to elect rep- 
resentatives of their choice. In response to the School Board's plan to 
introduce the Children of the Rainbow Curriculum? the New York City 
chapter of the Christian Coalition, an organization of the Christian Right: 
began an opposition campaign with the slogan "No Sodom on the Hud- 
son'y5 that pitted parents of color against so-called "rich white gays.yy6 
*Associate, Flemming, Zulack & Williamson, L.L.P., New York, N.Y.; B.A., Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvania, 1991; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1995. This Article was 
written with inspiration and encouragement from Professor Lani Guinier. Mary A. Inman 
provided guidance in the intricacies of proportional representation and voting rights law. 
Judith Reed served as my tutor in New York districting politics, as did Tom Duane, Robert 
Bailey, Dick Dadey, Alan Gartner, and George Waffle. I would also like to thank Alys I. 
Cohen, Scott B. Goldberg, Sarah Barringer Gordon, Jonathan Houlon, Marc Stein, Susan 
Sturm, and my parents, Edward and Susan Rosenblum. I dedicate this Article to Darren 
Kowitt, in admiration and love. 
1 A "proportional representation" system is an electoral system that accords repre- 
sentation to groups of voters in proportion to their voting strength. Cf: LANI GUINIER, 
RRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 214 
n.73 (1994). In such a system, an elected official represents those individuals who actually 
voted for her because her expressed views reflect their interests. Throughout this Article, 
proportional representation is contrasted to districting, a geographically based electoral 
system that currently predominates in the United States. See infra note 13. The form of 
proportional representation used in the School Board elections was the single transferable 
vote ("STY'), which is discussed at infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text. 
2For the purposes of this Article, the terms "lesbians" and "gay men" include 
individuals who are attracted, exclusively or not exclusively, to the same sex and who 
identify, privately or publicly, with that attraction. Although lesbians and gay men 
constitute two distinct groups with potentially different interests, they are considered 
together in this Article unless otherwise specified. 
The Rainbow Curriculum included history and social science lessons about racial, 
ethnic, and sexual minorities. See Teaching About Gays and Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 1992, 3 4, at 16. 
In this Article, the term "Christian Right" encompasses a broad range of individuals 
and organizations-notably the Christian Coalition-that support reactionary policies that 
deprive women, lesbians, and gay men of their rights. See generally Glen Maxey, Running 
Against the Right, in GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, OUT FOR OFFICE: CAMPAIGNING 
IN THE GAY NINETIES 159-63 (Kathleen DeBold ed., 1994) [hereinafter GAY AND LESBIAN 
VICTORY FUND]; Gail Shibley, Coming Out on Every Doorstep, in GAY AND LESBIAN 
VICTORY FUND 91-97. 
SSee N'Tanya Lee et al., Whose Kids? Our Kids! Race, Sexuality and the Right in 
New York City's Curriculum Battles, 25 RADICAL AM. 9, 17 (1991). 
See id. at 11-12. 
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Having succeeded in forcing the school chancellor's resignation, the Chris- 
tian Coalition formulated a plan for the takeover of all New York City 
school  board^.^ The proportional system of the school board elections, 
however, provided lesbian and gay communities8 with the opportunity to 
use their activism to defeat the homophobia of the Christian Right. By 
developing widely publicized endorsement slates based on questionnaires 
sent to all of the candidates, lesbian and gay communities attracted sup- 
port from a wide range of  vote^-s.~ And on election day-which occurred 
in the month following the highly successful 1993 Lesbian and Gay 
March on Washingtonlo-lesbians and gay men went to the polls in an 
unprecedented fashion." As a result, Jon Nalley, the leader of one lesbian 
and gay-supported slate, garnered the most votes of any school board 
candidate in the history of New York City, and the entire slate won.I2 
As the overwhelming victory of lesbian and gay interests in the 
school board elections demonstrates, a proportional representation system 
can effectively serve the interests of communities that have otherwise 
been unable to elect sufficient numbers of representatives. This Article 
focuses specifically on lesbian and gay communities because these com- 
munities have been among the least successful in getting their interests 
represented in the majority-rule districting system-the prevailing elec- 
toral system in the United States.I3 Although lesbian and gay communities 
have increased their political power, few elected officials represent lesbian 
and gay interests.I4 Furthermore, of the nearly half-million elected officials 
See Sam Dillon, Lifring a Cor~servative Voice; Christian Group Views School Board 
Electiorls as a Test of Voter Support, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1993, $ 1, at 23 (discussing 
political organizing by Christian activists for school board elections). 
8 A  "lesbian and gay community" comprises lesbians and gay men who share a 
common culture and common political values. A lesbian and gay community may also be 
geographically based. 
See Interview with Richard Dadey, Executive Director of Empire State Pride Agenda, 
in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 16, 1994); see also Telephone Interview with Jon Nalley, New 
York City School Board Representative (Nov. 12, 1995). 
l0See, e.g., Jeffrey Schmalz, March for Gay Rights; Gay Marchers Throng Mall in 
Appeal for Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al. 
"For instance, in the lesbian and gay West Village-Chelsea district, voter turnout 
quadrupled. See Sam Dillon, Light New York School Board Vote Was Really the Heaviest 
Ever, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1993, at Al. 
12See Sam Dillon, S~ipporters of Gay Rights Win More School Races, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 1993, at B3. 
I3A district is "[olne of the territorial areas into which an entire state or country, 
county, municipality, or other political subdivision is divided, for . . . electoral . . . 
purposes!' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (6th ed. 1990). A single-member district exists 
when a district is represented by one person. A multimember district exists when a district 
elects a group of people to represent it. These concepts are detailed in part 11. The only 
current alternative to districting is at-large voting, where "[ellected officials [are] chosen 
by the voters of the State [or other political subdivision] as a whole rather than from 
separate congressional or legislative districts." Id. at 125. 
I4For a description of "lesbian and gay interests," see infra part I.A. 
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in the United States, only seventy are openly lesbian or gay.15 This dearth 
of representatives has occurred because in a district-based electoral sys- 
tem, only geographically defined lesbian and gay communities have the 
opportunity to elect officials who represent their interests. Although many 
lesbians and gay men choose to live in areas with large lesbian and gay , 
populations, sexual orientation has no natural correlation to geography. 
This lack of a geographic correlation greatly decreases the ability of 
districting schemes to represent a broad base of lesbian and gay interests. 
Therefore, a districting system fails to ensure effective interest repre- 
sentation for lesbians and gay men.16 By contrast, a proportional repre- 
sentation system would greatly expand possibilities for lesbian and gay 
interest representation. 
Part I of this Article explores lesbian and gay interests and repre- 
sentational characteristics.17 Part I1 highlights the inadequacies of a 
single-member districting system in representing the interests of lesbian 
and gay communities. It concludes with an examination of the New York 
City Council's 1991 redistricting, where the mobilization of strong lesbian 
and gay communities in a receptive environment nonetheless failed to lead 
to effective representation of lesbian and gay interests in the City Council. 
Part 111 describes proportional representation systems and reveals how 
such systems would better serve lesbian and gay communities. Part IV 
acknowledges the political and legal obstacles to achieving proportional 
representation. Finally, Part V asserts that both the increasing disenfran- 
chisement of people of color from the electoral process and the high 
degree of discontent with the system that has been expressed by the 
general electorate in recent years might facilitate the conversion to a 
proportional system. To promote a proportional representation system, 
lesbian and gay communities must form coalitions with other minority 
communities that remain underrepresented in a districting system. By 
struggling with others to achieve interest representation, lesbians and gay 
men will be engaged in the furtherance of a much broader goal of pro- 
15 GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, supra note 4, at xiii. 
16 "Interest representation" occurs when a representative advocates for the interests of 
a body of voters. Lani Guinier, No Tivo Seats: The Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 1413, 1462 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]. In contrast to interest 
representation, "descriptive representation" occurs when a group is represented by one or 
more members of that group. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights 
Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1102 n.114 (1991) 
[hereinafter Guinier, Tokenism]. For example, lesbian and gay interest representation 
occurs when any elected official promotes a particular lesbian and gay interest; by contrast, 
only lesbian and gay elected officials can descriptively represent lesbians and gay men. 
'7For the purposes of this Article, the term "representational characteristics" means 
the characteristics of members of a group that shape the group's interaction with the 
electoral system. 
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portional representation-namely, the realization of a more complete de- 
mocracy. 
I. Lesbian and Gay Interests and Representational Characteristics 
Despite the difficulty of defining lesbian and gay identity,18 lesbians 
and gay men need to have their interests represented. After identifying the 
interests of lesbians and gay men, this Part will examine certain charac- 
teristics of lesbians and gay men that affect their representation. The 
purpose of this examination is to assess the ability of a single-member 
districting system to achieve effective lesbian and gay interest repre- 
sentation. 
A. Lesbian and Gay Interests and the Need for Effective Interest 
Representation 
Lesbian and gay interests arise from the wide array of legal issues 
facing lesbian and gay cornm~nities.~~ Anti-lesbian and gay violence vic- 
timizes a shockingly high percentage of lesbians and gay men, wreaking 
heavy damage individually and c~llect ively.~~ As localities debate how to 
promote Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome'("AIDS") awareness and 
prevent the spread of the disease, Congress considers whether to curtail 
government funding for AIDS research and medical careJ1 Schools and 
child welfare agencies fail to meet the needs of lesbian and gay 
and employment discrimination plagues lesbians and gay menJ3 States 
use solicitation and sodomy statutes, which have been upheld by the 
l8See, e.g.. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND 
GAY STUDIES READER 45, 55 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (discussing the "incoher- 
ence of modern ways of conceptualizing same-sex desire and, hence, gay identity"). 
'!For an overview of the various forms of harassment and discrimination faced by 
lesbians and gay men and of the inadequate protections provided by the legal system, see 
L o s n r ~ ~ s ,  GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (surveying cases, 
statutes, legal theory, and relevant fiction); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation 
attd the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989) (summarizing various legal areas as they 
affect lesbians and gay men). 
20See gerterally GARY D. COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 
(1991). 
2l Bennett Roth, AIDS Advocates Fear Brunt of Medicaid Cuts, HOUS. CHRON., NOV. 
4, 1995, at Al; The Bottoln Line is People are Dying, AIDS Funding is at Risk as Some 
irt Cottgress Turtt Penny-wise and Pound Foolish, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at B8. 
ZZSee, e.g., Donna Dennis & Ruth Harlow, Gay Youth and the Right to Education, 4 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 446 (1986), reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW, supra 
note 19, at 156; Lori Nessel & Kevin Ryan, Migrant Farmworkers, Homeless andRunalvay 
Youth: Challertging the Barriers to Inclusion, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 99 (1994). 
23See generally James Douglas, I Sit and Look Out: Employment Discrimination 
Agaittst Hotnosexuals and the New Law of Unjust Dismissal, 33 WASH. U .  J. URB. & 
CONTE~IP. L  73 (1988); Gail Heatherly, Gay and Lesbian Rights: Employment Discrimi- 
natiott, 4 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 901 (1986). 
D 
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United States Supreme to harass and intimidate lesbians and gay 
men. Moreover, courts reinforce homophobia by excluding lesbians and 
gay men from family rights such as marriagesz5 and child 
custody." Lesbian and gay communities thus have a profound need for 
representation at all levels of government-though few voting rights scholars 
discuss lesbian and gay interests?* 
In the face of anti-lesbian and gay discrimination, lesbians and gay 
men have become more politically active. Local controversies such as 
those concerning curricula in public schools and books in public libraries 
help .build communities and coalitions that serve well for broader political 
issues. Additionally, communities and coalitions have organized in oppo- 
sition to state anti-lesbian and gay referenda.29 This political organizing 
in localities and states across the country presages the kind of organiza- 
tion needed to represent lesbian and gay interests in the legislative, ex- 
ecutive, and even judicial branches of state and federal government. 
Electing advocates of lesbian and gay interests serves several pur- 
poses. First, achieving lesbian and gay interest representation might sway 
lesbians and gay men to "keep the faitY30 in the ability of the government 
"Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy law). 
25See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is not violated by a prohibition of 
same-sex marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review denied, 
84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) (holding that a prohibition of same-sex marriage did not 
constitute sex discrimination). But see Baehr v. Lewin, 853 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding 
that the prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the privacy and equal protection 
guarantees of the Hawaiian constitution and that this prohibition constituted sex discrimi- 
nation meriting strict scrutiny). 
26See generally Julia F. Davies, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional 
Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1055 (1995). But see 111 
re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643883 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) (upholding the adoption 
by a lesbian of her partner's child). 
='See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio 1985) (denying a gay 
father visiting rights until the children were old enough not to be influenced by his "errant 
behavior"); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (reversing a lower court's 
decision that granted custody of a child to his lesbian mother, awarding custody to the 
child's grandmother). 
28For some exceptions, see Mary A. Inman, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional 
Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991,2005 
(1993) and William H. Kysella, Jr., Gerrymandering Against Gays?, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 
249 (1994) (discussing representation of lesbians and gay men in California). 
- 29Political organizing against such referenda has involved uniting and mobilizing 
progressive, urban parts of states against rural areas that have generally supported the 
referenda. The fight against Amendment 2, Colorado's anti-lesbian and gay referendum, 
gained national attention with widespread boycotts and support for the legal team opposing 
the amendment. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Colorado Faces Boycott Over Its Gay-Bias Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at A16. Oregon's anti-lesbian and gay referenda led to enormous 
efforts in and out of the state to defeat the two measures. See, e.g., John Gallagher, Taking 
the Initiative: Battles Over Gay Rights Intensify in Ohio, Colorado and Oregon, ADVO- 
CATE, Oct. 5, 1993, at 24. 
3OThis slogan of Harlem's U.S. Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., applies well 
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to respond to the needs of subjugated minorities. Second, the purpose of 
lesbian and gay interest representation is not merely to change the law, 
but, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, to "expand and affect 
political debate.7731 Since lesbians and gay men constitute a minority of 
the population, even increased representation may not lead to the full 
realization of their interests. Nonetheless, visibility, awareness, and pro- 
gress should follow from broader discussion of lesbian and gay interests. 
B. The Representational Characteristics of Lesbians and Gay Men 
Three characteristics of lesbians and gay men affect the representation 
of their interests: lesbians and gay men are officially unidentifiable, they 
have intersectional identities, and they are often geographically dispersed." 
First, because lesbians and gay men can choose whether to identify pub- 
licly and politically with their sexual orientation, they constitute an "officially 
unidentifiable" g ro~p .3~  For districting purposes, simplistic notions of identity 
are used to locate racial minorities. Racial identity, for all its complexity, 
is officially quite fixed. In contrast, lesbians and gay men are able to pass 
as heterosexual, thus rendering the location of lesbian and gay communi- 
ties difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, districts are drawn from census 
data, which do not include information on sexual 0rientation.3~ Alternative 
methods, such as through records of contributors to lesbian and gay 
organizations and the mapping of lesbian and gay businesses and institu- 
tions, also fail to identify accurately the location and size of lesbian and 
gay communit ie~.~~ 
to the tenuous relationship between lesbian and gay voters and the government. See Lani 
Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 393, 435 n.7 (1989). 
3' Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 202 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissent- 
ing), quoted irz Lani Guinier, The Represerztation of Minority Interests: The Question of 
Sitigle-Mernber Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1146 (1993) [hereinafter Guinier, 
Sirtgle-Member Districts]. 
32Barbara A. Weightman, Conznzentary: Towards a Geography of the Gay Community, 
1 J. CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 106, 107 (1981) ("The at-large gay community is not a 
community in the traditional sociological sense in that it lacks a broad definable territorial 
base with primary institutions serving a residential population."); see also Kysella, supra 
note 28, at 265. 
33The term "officially unidentifiable" is used to indicate that political systems are 
unable to determine who is lesbian or gay. 
s4Although same-sex households, which the census does quantify, might indicate 
some lesbian and gay population, such statistics are overinclusive to the extent that they 
include college fraternities, sororities, and the many heterosexual men and women who 
live together. Similarly, many lesbians and gay men live with members of the opposite sex 
and would thus be undercounted if same-sex households were the only measures used to 
quantify lesbian and gay communities. 
a5See irlfra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
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The continuum of sexuality is another complicating factor that con- 
tributes to the unidentifiability of lesbians and gay men. Sexual identity 
and interests are fluid within individuals and over The fact that 
general lesbian and gay population estimates vary greatly demonstrates 
the difficulty of locating and quantifying lesbian and gay communities. 
The second representational characteristic of lesbians and gay men is 
that they have intersectional identities.37 Lesbians and gay men comprise 
many racial, ethnic, class, and gender groups and, therefore, face multiple 
di~criminations.3~ Respecting the unique ways in which women, racial 
minorities, poor people, and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups 
face anti-lesbian and gay discrimination requires consideration of their 
different interests as part of the overall need for lesbian and gay interest 
repre~entation.~~ 
The third characteristic of lesbians and gay men is related to inter- 
sectionality: lesbians and gay men are geographically dispersed. Although 
some lesbians and gay men live in identifiable urban "ghettos,"40 many 
live in neighborhoods correlated with their class, race, or ethnicity rather 
36The 10% figure cited in Alfred Kinsey's landmark studies of human sexuality serves 
as a common reference point for quantifying lesbian and gay communities, even for 
representation purposes. See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN 
FEMALE (1953); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 
(1948); see also, The Case of the Missing Districts, OUTWEEK, May 1, 1991, at 4 ("[Llesbians 
and gays, with at least 10% of the city's population, deserve at least five [of 51 seats on 
the City Council]."). But see Felicity Barringer, Sex Survey of American Men Finds 1% 
Are Gay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at Al; Stuart Elliott, A Sharper View of Gay 
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at Dl. 
37The meaning of the term "intersectional" here follows that used by Professor 
Kimberlk Crenshaw, which refers to a person's multiple, oppressed identities. For example, 
African American women are oppressed as African Americans and as women, and have 
multiple identities as a result of the oppression that the two groups face. Crenshaw argues 
that this multiple discrimination is both heavier than and distinct from the sum of its parts. 
See generally Kimberlk Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U .  CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). For a closer examination of intersectionality 
in lesbian and gay communities, see Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the 
Failure of Lesbian and Gay Victories, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83 (1994). 
38The use of the plural "genders" indicates the multiplicity of genders that exist and 
acknowledges the important role of transgendered individuals in the lesbian dnd gay 
movement. For a powerful account of life at the borders of gender, see KATE BORNSTEIN, 
GENDER OUTLAW (1994). 
39As a participant in Gay and Lesbian Youth of New York from 1984 to 1986, I 
observed the differing needs of white, African American, and Latino lesbian and gay youth. 
The white teenagers more often had their own rooms in their homes and thus greater 
privacy. In addition, they were better able to afford the cafes and restaurants to which the 
group retreated after meetings. The teenagers of color, by contrast, often had no private 
space and less disposable money. As a result, the teenagers of color "hung out" more in 
the street and thus may have faced more police and other homophobic harassment. These 
different perspectives could also affect political decisions. For example, although harsher 
policing of the streets would not seem to be a problematic issue for white lesbians and 
gay men, it would negatively affect lesbians and gay men of color. 
40Many refer to lesbian and gay urban communities as "ghettos." See, e.g., MANUEL 
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than their sexual orientation-either by choice or economic ne~ess i ty .~~  
Lesbians are particularly dispersed in that they "tend not to concentrate 
in a given territory, but establish social and interpersonal networks."42 In 
addition, the increasing tendency among lesbians and gay men to move 
to the suburbs, which reflects the movement of the population as a whole, 
contributes to geographic dispersionP3 
11. Subjugation of Lesbian and Gay Interest Representation Through 
Districting 
Districting relies on two premises that render it an ineffective system 
of representation for lesbians and gay men-even in the absence of ho- 
mophobic motivation on the part of district line drawers. First, for dis- 
tricting to ensure the representation of a community's interests, line draw- 
ers must be able to identify the community. Because lesbians and gay men 
are officially unidentifiable, representing their interests through a district- 
ing scheme would prove to be a challenge even for the most supportive 
of line drawers. Second, the community must be compact enough to fall 
into one district. Therefore, to the extent that lesbians and gay men are 
dispersed, a districting system cannot effectively or accurately represent 
lesbian and gay interests. 
This Part addresses the barriers to achieving effective lesbian and gay 
interest representation in a districting system. First, it outlines districting 
guidelines and reveals how, despite such guidelines, all districting actually 
constitutes gerrymandering. Second, it analyzes the possible outcomes for 
lesbian and gay interest representation in a districting system. Third, it 
demonstrates that: under each of these outcomes, problems exist that limit 
the potential for effective lesbian and gay interest representation. Fourth, 
it shows that even where effective lesbian and gay interest representation 
CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF URBAN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 137 (1982) (describing gay migration to coastal cities). 
41 There is some indication that lesbians and gay men of color more frequently remain 
in their families' neighborhoods instead of moving to predominantly lesbian or gay 
neighborhoods that are often white. Randy Kennedy, Christopher Street: Changes Sweep 
the Gay Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, 8 14, at 6. 
42 See CASTELLS, supra note 40, at 140. ("On the whole they are poorer than gay men 
and have less choice in terms of work and location, and their politics is less directed 
towards the established political system.") (citations omitted). But see Sy Adler &Johanna 
Brenner, Gender and Space: Lesbians and Gay Men in the City, 16 INT'L J. URB. & 
REGIONAL RES. 24 (1992) (arguing that lesbians are more spatially concentrated than the 
general literature suggests). 
43See Jane Gross, A Milestone in the Fight for Gay Rights: A Quiet Suburban Life, 
N.Y. Trhres, June 30, 1991, § 4, at 16. Further, suburban lesbians and gay men, because 
they lead a different lifestyle from their urban counterparts, may have different repre- 
sentational needs. Cf. Frederick R. Lynch, Nonghetto Gays: An Ethnography of Suburban 
Honrosexuals, in GAY CULTURE IN AMERICA 165 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1992). 
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is prevented by districting, lesbian and gay communities are unable to 
obtain Voting Rights Act remedies. Finally, it describes the 1991 redis- 
tricting for the New York City Council, which exemplifies the inadequacy 
of districting systems in representing lesbian and gay interests. 
A. Districting Requirements 
The act of districting is subject to constitutional and statutory guide- 
lines. First, stemming from several 1964 Supreme Court cases44 and their 
population equality standards require.strict equality of popula- 
tion among all districts in a jurisdiction. A second requirement is that 
apportionment not "minimize or eliminate7' the power of a political 
The third criterion in apportionment-the prevention of racial dis- 
crimination-is the most contentious and has potentially the greatest im- 
pact on lesbian and gay interest representation because in urban spaces, 
racial, ethnic, and lesbian and gay communities often share a small geo- 
graphic area.47 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, its 1982 amendments, and 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions prohibit districting that is designed 
to weaken racial group voting potential.48 The Voting Rights Act thereby 
increased the likelihood that racial minorities would elect representatives 
of their choice.49 Section 2 of the Act permits racial and language minori- 
ties to challenge districting plans that dilute their voting power, which 
44See Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (overturning Colorado's 
state legislative apportionment plans because they were not sufficiently grounded on 
population); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause requires that both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on 
a population basis); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring congressional 
districts to represent equal numbers of people). 
4s See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding that there are no de minimis 
standards below which deviation from complete equality is constitutional); Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1972) (upholding a Virginia state legislature apportionment plan 
with an average variance of 3.89%); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (holding 
that respecting political subdivisions cannot derail the strict requirement of a good faith 
effort to achieve mathematically precise equality). 
46 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (holding a Connecticut apportionment 
that attempted to reflect the state's balance of party affiliation to be constitutional); see 
also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding that political gerrymandering 
violates the Equal Protection Clause and that a threshold showing of discriminatory vote 
dilution is required for a prima facie claim). 
471n recent years, the Supreme Court has transformed the role that race may legiti- 
mately play in the districting process. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); 
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). For more discussion of the impact of this change, 
see infra part 1V.A. 
48See White v. Register, 412 U.S. 757 (1993) (striking down multimember Texas 
House districts for diluting black and Hispanic votes); Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 
30 (1985) (rejecting the use of multimember districts in North Carolina's legislative 
reapportionment for undermining the effectiveness of black votes). 
49S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
177, 182. 
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occurs when a plan reduces or excludes a minority's voice in the political 
pr0cess.5~ Section 5 is intended to protect minority voting rights in a 
jurisdiction that is specifically required to preclear its districting plans 
with the United States Justice Department.sl The Voting Rights Act, how- 
ever, does not require the creation of majority districts based on race or 
ethni~ity.5~ 
Ideally, these criteria would be used to guide redistricting. In prac- 
tice, however, districting is not an objective process. As recognized by the 
Supreme Court in GafSney v. Cummings, "[dlistrict lines are rarely neutral 
phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly 
Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely 
. . . . The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have 
substantial political  consequence^."^^ In practice, districting must be per- 
formed by a group-either a legislature or an entity appointed by a 
legislature-that is necessarily minuscule relative to the population being 
divided. Any such group can attempt to engineer electoral politics by 
dividing the population into favorably constructed electorates. When the 
majority group has the power to draw distinct lines without any protec- 
tions for minority groups, the majority can institutionalize its dominance. 
Such a representational system in a pervasively homophobic society di- 
rectly impedes lesbian and gay interest representation. 
B. Possible Outcomes for Lesbian and Gay Interest Representation in 
a Districting System 
The Voting Rights Act permits lesbian and gay interest representation 
only when the creation of a lesbian and gay district would not interfere 
with the drawing of a majority-minority Since the most visible 
and heretofore represented lesbian and gay communities have largely been 
located in urban areas, the three outcomes described in this Section pre- 
sume an urban context. The first two possible outcomes for lesbian and 
gay interest representation under the Voting Rights Act involve a lesbian 
and gay community that is located entirely within one district, while the 
third involves a community split by two or more districts. 
Sovoting Rights Act of 1965 5 2, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (1988). 
51 Voting Rights Act of 1965 5 5, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973c (1988). 
52See John R. Dunne, Remarks: Redistricting in the 1990s: The New York Example, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (1993). 
53412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). 
54"Majority-minority" indicates a majority of racial, ethnic, or language minorities. 
See SUBMISSION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FOR PRECLEARANCE OF 
THE 1991 REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL (June 17, 1989) (on file 
with the New York Municipal Library) [hereinafter SUBMISSION]. The SUBMISSION did not 
include sexual minorities in this group. 
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The first possible outcome is the creation of a majority-lesbian and 
gay d i s t r i ~ t . ~ ~  This outcome occurs primarily in predominantly white dis- 
tricts when several adjacent majority-minority districts have left a con- 
centrated white lesbian and gay community. Given that facilitating minor- 
ity representation is the fundamental goal of the Voting Rights Act, cities 
tend to draw majority-minority districts first, thus subordinating the crea- 
tion of lesbian and gay districts to Voting Rights Act  requirement^.^^ 
A lesbian and gay community that is too small to form an entire 
single-member district might completely fall withhi the bandaries of a 
district. This second possible outcome, a lesbian and gay "influence dis- 
trict," could exist in a white, multicultural, or majority-minority 
Such a district would permit voters in a lesbian and gay community to 
sway elections and would provide them with ample attention from candi- 
dates. One could well imagine a candidate who represented lesbian and 
gay interests succeeding in such a progressive district-although such a 
candidate necessarily would have to appeal to voters outside of the lesbian 
and gay community. 
An influential lesbian and gay community is only possible, however, 
where the majority is not hostile to lesbian and gay interests. In a district 
where anti-lesbian and gay sentiment divided the population, candidates 
representing lesbian and gay interests could be consistently defeated- 
even if forty-nine percent of the district were lesbian and gay. In such a 
district, a lesbian and gay community could lose any influence that its 
size might otherwise afford it. 
Although lesbian and gay majority and influence districts provide the 
best opportunity for lesbian and gay interest representation in a districting 
system, the third outcome-in which a lesbian and gay community is 
"New York City Council District 3 is such a district. ~ e t w e e n  the West Harlem and 
Chinatown districts is an area that is approximately 75% white-more than 30 percentage 
points above the city average. Community pressure in this area led to the creation of a 
majority-lesbian and gay district. See Felicia R. Lee, Plan for New City Council Passes 
in Praise and Anger, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1991, at B1 [hereinafter Plan Passes]. It is less 
likely that a majority-minority district would be formed with a majority of lesbians and 
gay men of color, because well-known lesbian and gay "ghettos" are generally located in 
white neighborhoods. The statistics used to advocate for a lesbian and gay district, which 
are based on donor lists to lesbian and gay organizations, probably do not reflect the size 
of lesbian and gay communities of color because those communities may not participate 
as frequently in donor programs. See Testimony by Richard Dadey, Executive Director of 
Empire State Pride Agenda, before the New York City Districting Commission (Mar. 27. 
1991) (on file with author). 
s6See Interview with Judith Reed, General Counsel for the 1991 New York City 
Districting Commission, in New York, N.Y. @ec. 27, 1993). 
57Robert Bailey argues that New York City Council District 25 (Jackson Heights, 
Queens) is an example of such a district. "All the Black, Latino (mostly Colombian), and 
gay communities agreed on a middle class majority-minority district with a white liberal 
minority." Interview with Robert Bailey, Consultant to the New York City Districting 
Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 30, 1993). 
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"fractured" between districts-frustrates the opportunity for a lesbian and 
gay community to elect an official who is responsive to the interests of 
its members. In this situation, members of a community that might be 
large enough to qualify as a majority in a hypothetical district, but that 
lacks the political power necessary to sway the process, would be unable 
to combine their votes for the representative of their choice because they 
would be split among two or more districts.58 
C. Districting Problems that Limit the Potential for Effective Lesbian 
and Gay Interest Representation 
Achieving some degree of lesbian and gay interest representation 
through a majority district or an influence district may be a worthy goal. 
Indeed, in the context of a seemingly unchangeable representational sys- 
tem, it may be essential in empowering lesbian and gay communities. 
Even when lesbian and gay interest representation is possible, however, 
its effectiveness is dampened by the problems of "virtual representation," 
"hierarchization of communities," and "tokenism." 
I .  Virtual Representation 
First among these representational problems is "virtual representation," 
a situation in which an individual's interests are theoretically represented 
by officials elected by other districts.59 In contrast, "direct representation" 
assumes that an individual is represented only by those elected repre- 
sentatives for whom the individual voted.60 Professor Lani Guinier has 
observed that virtual representation is founded on the following miscon- 
ceptions: indirect representation; representation of similar interests else- 
where; and top-down repre~entation.~~ Each of these three assumptions 
misleads people into accepting the value of districting. Under the indirect 
representation assumption, for example, New York City Council District 
3, which was created as a lesbian and gay district, indirectly represents 
lesbian and gay voters city-wide outside of that district. The "gay district" 
58 For example, fracturing occurred when Park Slope and neighboring areas in Brook- 
lyn, collectively constituting the most concentrated lesbian and gay community in New 
York City, were split among adjacent majority-minority districts that had been drawn to 
satisfy the Voting Rights Act's requirement that racial minorities be protected. Interview 
with Robert Bailey, supra note 57. 
59See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case 
of the Ettiperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1607 n.79 (1993) [hereinafter Guinier, 
Etttperor's Clorhes]; see also JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE 
AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 50 (1989) (stating that the English claimed that the 
American colonies were represented in Parliament by virtual representation). 
60Guinier, Ettiperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1612. 
61 Id. at 1607. 
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representative thus becomes the politician upon whom all lesbian and gay 
voters in the city depend. 
The second assumption is that while lesbian and gay communities 
outside of the lesbian and gay district may not have direct representation, 
their interests are represented to the extent that they coincide with the 
interests of those directly represented elsewhere within the jurisdiction. . 
Their votes are, therefore, not wasted, even though they were cast for the 
losing party in their district. The notion, however, that one representative 
can serve different, voiceless lesbian and gay c o m ~ o i t j e s  in a jurisdic- 
tion ignores potentially profound distinctions among communit ie~.~~ 
The third assumption of viaual representation, topdown representation, 
leads to the conclusion that the lesbian and gay voters who opposed a 
homophobic representative are nonetheless represented by her because 
they live within her district. However, it is unlikely that a representative 
would vote based on the interests of those who opposed her. Top-down 
representation would prove particularly frustrating for a district influence 
group, which would see its community shut out of the political process 
despite its considerable size. 
2. Hierarchization in Communities 
Virtual representation, which excludes individual communities from 
the opportunity to elect their representatives of choice, creates a hierarchy 
between those communities that can choose representation and those for 
whom representation is chosen--even though the communities may share 
similar interests. The lesbian and gay communities that reside within 
lesbian and gay majority or influence districts attain greater prominence 
through their representation. By contrast, lesbians and gay men of color 
who choose to live in neighborhoods that reflect their racial or ethnic 
identity might forfeit direct representation of their lesbian or gay identity 
when their jurisdiction's only lesbian or gay district is majority-white. If 
the sole representative of lesbian and gay interests comes from a predomi- 
nantly white district, lesbian and gay interests tend to be constructed 
around this whiteness. 
The resulting hierarchy among lesbian and gay communities raises 
similar theoretical problems to those that confront race-based districting, 
including essentialism, isolation, and division.63 Essentialist notions of 
identity, in which a set of characteristics is assumed to apply to all 
members of that group, are encouraged by the districting process. Dis- 
tricting accords directly represented lesbians and gay men an essentialist 
62Zd. at 1608. 
63See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: 
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 634-39 (1993). 
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identity, whereby their characteristics and needs are imputed to all other 
lesbians and gay men. 
San Francisco Supervisor Harry Britt's statement that "[wlhen gays 
are spatially scattered, they are not gay, because they are in~isible,"~" 
demonstrates the isolating effects of districting. Under a districting sys- 
tem, location means identity, and those lesbians and gay men either 
uninterested or unable to live in a represented area are, for political 
purposes, not gay. For example, if lesbians in Park Slope, Brooklyn, 
disagreed with gay men in the West Village, their disagreement would 
have little impact on the City Council; the "lesbian and gay" position 
would be that of the largely white and male West Village-Chelsea district. 
Similarly, the fact that lesbian and gay direct representation in California 
comes from San Francisco and West Hollywood transforms these commu- 
nities into the lesbian and gay voice of the state.65 As the directly repre- 
sented community is both privileged with respect to and isolated from 
other local lesbian and gay communities, districting divides the interests 
of virtually represented communities from those that are directly repre- 
sented. 
3. Tokenism 
"Tokenism" refers to the marginalization of a minority group's single 
representative within a majority space.66 Tokenism assumes that all of the 
lesbian and gay communities in a jurisdiction can be represented ade- 
quately by a single representative. Although that one representative might 
provide effective representation in some respects, her abilities would be 
limited as the only direct representative of lesbian and gay interests in the 
jurisdiction. Therefore, tokenism can be construed as an attempt to silence 
calls for fuller representation of lesbian and gay  interest^.^^ 
D. Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men from Remedies for Vote 
Dilution 
The previous Section described the problems that occur when lesbian 
and gay communities achieve some interest representation through dis- 
tricting. This Section shows that where lesbian and gay communities are 
unable to attain any interest representation at all-a situation that may 
occur where a community is fractured or even in an influence district- 
64 CASTELLS, supra note 40, at 138. 
65Qe Kysella, supra note 28, at 265-67. 
66Guinier, Tokerlism, supra note 16, at 1116. 
67See, e.g., The Case of tlze Missing Districts, OUTWEEK, May 1, 1991, at 4 (deriding 
the lesbian and gay district in the New York City Districting Commission's proposed 
redistricting plan as "an afterthought, a bone to  throw to our community"). 
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they are unlikely to achieve redress through either statutory or constitu- 
tional means. 
The Voting Rights Act does not recognize lesbians and gay men as a 
protected group, nor does any other judicial remedy apply specifically to 
lesbian and gay "vote dilution."68 According to the definitive Supreme 
Court case on vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act, Thornburg v. 
G i n g l e ~ , ~ ~  the central remedy for dilution is the creation of majority- 
minority single-member distri~ts.7~ To satisfy the three prongs of the 
Gingles test, a minority group must demonstrate that it is both geographi- 
cally concentrated and sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority of a 
single-member district, that it is politically cohesive, and that its electoral 
success is being impeded by majority bloc v0ting.7~ A minority group 
must therefore be sufficiently large and geographically compact to con- 
stitute a majority in a hypothetical single-member distri~t.7~ 
It would be difficult for lesbian and gay communities to meet the first 
prong of the Gingles test because of the geographic dispersion of lesbian 
and gay voters and because of their intersectional identities. This prong 
is more easily met by African American communities, which face far 
greater housing segregation-and thus geographic concentration-than do 
lesbians and gay me11.7~ Although some lesbians and gay men rightfully 
claim that social and even housing discrimination leads them to live in 
predominantly lesbian and gay neighborh0ods,7~ this "ghettoization" does 
not generally provide sufficient geographic concentration for a section 2 
claim. 
The second prong of the Gingles test is that the minority group must 
be politically cohe~ive.~S uch cohesiveness is demonstrated by a high 
68Vote dilution has been defined as "a process whereby election laws or practices, 
either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable 
group to diminish the voting strength of at least another group." Chandler Davidson, 
Introduction, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 4 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). 
69478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
70Zd. at 45-51. 
71Zd. at 48-51. It should be noted that the existence of the three Gingles factors is 
necessary, but not sufficient, proof of a section 2 violation under the Voting Rights Act. 
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994). See generally BERNARD 
GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 
61-81 (1992) (tracing vote dilution standard after Gingles). However, this Article argues 
that lesbians and gay men cannot meet the burden of proof even for the threshold Gingles 
factors. More recent Supreme Court reformulation of vote dilution analysis is thus not 
particularly relevant here. 
72See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. 
73The "extreme spacial segregation" of African Americans lends some validity to the 
use of geography for the purpose of ensuring adequate group representation. See Lani 
Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 127 
n.119 (1994). 
74 Cf. CASTELLS, supra note 40, at 138-39. 
75See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-73. 
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"correlation between the race of the voter and the voter's choice of certain 
 candidate^."^^ Lesbians and gay men might indeed vote alike on certain 
issues. Proving political cohesiveness, however, would require evidence 
that is unavailable for lesbians and gay men because they are officially 
unidentifiable. Furthermore, despite certain common lesbian and gay in- 
terests, the views of lesbians and gay men span the political spectrum.77 
The third and final prong of the Gingles test requires that the minority 
group's preferred candidate be defeated by majority bloc voting.78 The 
fact that lesbians and gay men, as well as heterosexual candidates sup- 
porting lesbian and gay interests, have been elected would make it difficult 
to prove that heterosexual bloc voting has excluded the "preferred candi- 
dates" of lesbians and gay men from public office. 
Dilution might also be proven through fracturing and packing?9 When 
minority voters are packed into a district beyond the numbers needed to 
assure a majority, their jurisdiction-wide influence is weakened. Con- 
versely, when those votes are spread among districts at levels lower than 
those needed for a majority, they are unable to elect a representative, and 
their influence in the governing process is fractured.80 Remedies exist for 
packing and fracturing, but they generally require "hard data," such as 
census data, that are largely available only for racial and ethnic minority 
c~mmuni t ies .~~ Finding incontrovertible proof of lesbian and gay fractur- 
ing, by contrast, would be impossible because there is no possible base- 
line calculation of the voting potential of lesbians and gay men. 
One writer has argued that, instead of bringing a claim under the 
Voting Rights Act, lesbians and gay men can challenge vote dilution under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.82 Even if such 
an argument were successful, however, the representational characteristics 
76 ~ d .  at 53. 
77The existence of gay Republican clubs as well as radical groups such as ACT-UP 
reflects the political diversity of lesbians and gay men. See generally FRANK BROWNING, 
THE CULTURE OF DESIRE (1993) (exploring the complex politics of gay male communi- 
ties). 
78 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 ("Flhe minority must be able to demonstrate that the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, 
such as the minority candidate's running unopposed-usually to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate."). 
79See GROFMAN, supra note 71, at 114. 
sosee Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1615; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1075-76 (2d ed. 1988). 
81Even where such numbers are lacking, name identification programs may help 
clarify the location of particular ethnic groups. See Peter Momsson, Using the Surname 
Method to Gauge Hispanic and Asian Voting Strength in Proposed Council Districts, Ex. 
12 of Exhibits Book 1 of SUBMISSION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FOR 
PRECLEARANCE OF TIIE 1991 REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL 6 (Feb. 
20, 1991) (on file with the New York Municipal Library). 
8ZSee Kysella, supra note 28, at 262-74 (arguing that lesbian and gay communities 
in urban California could prevail under an equal protection cause of action). 
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of lesbians and gay men pose a remedial problem in any districting 
system. Therefore, an equal protection remedy-so long as it is district- 
based--does nothing to resolve the problems of virtual representation, 
hierarchization, and tokenism. Further, the lack of any census data dooms 
a lesbian or gay plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination in districting 
procedures. In any case, until the United States Supreme Court clarifies 
the constitutional status of lesbians and gay men, the ultimate success of 
any equal protection challenge to districting is highly q~est ionable.~~ 
In sum, it is unlikely that challenges under either the 'doting Rights 
Act or the Equal Protection Clause will succeed in remedying the inade- 
quate representation of lesbian and gay interests under our current dis- 
tricting system. 
E. Redistricting the New York City Council 
The gay and lesbian community, long a contributor to the life 
and spirit which is uniquely New York's, deserves a seat at the 
table. 84 
Recent events in New York City provide an excellent example of 
districting's inadequacies with respect to lesbian and gay interest repre- 
sentation. In Board of Estimate v. Morris,ss the United States Supreme 
Court declared a portion of New York City's government unconstitutional. 
The Court held that allowing all of the boroughs to have the same number 
of representatives despite their vast disparities in population violated the 
constitutional mandate of one-person, o n e - v ~ t e . ~ ~  Remedying this uncon- 
stitutionality led to radical structural change that expanded the power and 
size of the City Council while spurring a complex interaction of interest 
group politics and mandated req~irements.~~ In 1991, the combination of 
S3The Supreme Court may make its position on the constitutional rights of lesbians 
and gay men more explicit this Term in its decision regarding Colorado's Amendment 2. 
See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (striking down a Colorado constitutional 
amendment providing that lesbian or gay conduct, orientation, or practices could not 
provide the basis for protected class status), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995). 
S4Evelyn Hernandez, Gays Launch Drive for Council, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 7, 1991, 
at 7 (auoting Richard Dadev, Executive Director of Empire State Pride Agenda). 
G289 ~ . s .  688 (1989):- - 
s6Zd.; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Frank J. Macchiarola & 
Joseph G. Diaz, The 1990 New York City Districtinn Commission: Renewed Opportunity 
for iarticipation in Local Government o;  ace-  as& Gerrymandering?, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1175, 1181 (1993). 
See Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bulhvinkles: The Limitations of 
Single-Member Districts in a Multiracial Context, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 764 (1993). 
The New York City Charter Revision Commission considered several reforms to satisfy 
the constitutional requirements of Board of Estimate v. Morris. It considered bicameral 
legislatures. Id. It also contemplated adopting weighted voting and even proportional 
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the New York City Districting Commission's ("Com~nission'~) relatively open 
decision-making process, the Commission's independence from the City 
Council, and strong advocacy by lesbian and gay communities before the 
Commission created perhaps the best possible opportunity for lesbians and 
gay men to obtain effective interest representation through districting. While 
the Commission subsequently did create one majority-lesbian and gay 
district, the constraints of a districting system nonetheless left the inter- 
ests of New York's lesbian and gay communities largely unrepresented. 
The Commission's effort to empower minorities and reverse New 
York's decades-old record of weak minority representation was bolstered 
by the 1990 census.88 That census revealed that New York City had become 
majority-minority, with 56.3% of its population identifying as African 
American, Latino, or Asian American. Although Judith Reed has noted 
that "[tlhe work of the Commission was favorably affected by the pres- 
ence of so many members of racial and language minority groups pro- 
tected by the Voting Rights Act,"89 it was still a small body that made 
fundamental decisions for the entire city's representation.gO 
The Commission conducted as open a process as could be imagined 
for a group appointed to draw the lines that would determine the repre- 
sentation of the entire population of the city. It held public hearings in all 
neighborhoods of the city, provided public access to its computer district- 
ing program,gl and reviewed over thirty alternate plans submitted by com- 
munity groups and other concerned parties.g2 Furthermore, the Commis- 
sion delineated districts primarily by focusing on concentrations of racial 
and language minorities. Once districts were drawn around these areas, 
white districts filled in the remainder of the map?3 
As part of the criteria for redistricting, the New York City Charter 
left open the possibility of representing the interests of lesbian and gay 
communities. "District lines," it read, "shall keep intact neighborhoods 
and communities with established ties of common interest and associa- 
tion, whether historical, racial, economic, ethnic, religious or other.7794 The 
representation. See Interview with Judith Reed, supra note 56. The Commission ultimately 
supported overhauling the City Council. SUBMISSION, supra note 54. 
assee Interview with Judith Reed, supra note 56; see also ALAN GARTNER, DRAWING 
THE LINES: REDISTRICTING AND THE POLITICS OF RACIAL SUCCESSION I  NEW YORK 55-56 
n.72 (1993). 
89Affidavit of Judith Reed at 1, Ravitch v. City of N.Y., No. 90 Civ. 5752 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 3, 1992). 
gOThe Commission comprised four African Americans, three Latinos, one Asian 
American, and seven whites. Id. 
91See GARTNER, supra note 88, at 135. 
92See Interview with Judith Reed, supra note 56. 
93See id. This action was taken prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. 
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (holding that a Georgia district drawn predominantly to 
empower African Americans violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
9 4 C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 5 52(l)(c) (as amended Dec. 31, 1989). 
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term "other" was a subtle reference to sexual o r i en t a t i~n ,~~  thus giving 
consideration of lesbian and gay interest representation precedence in line 
drawing over such traditional but not constitutionally mandated considerations 
as compactnessg6 and respect for neighborhood and borough bo~ndaries.9~ 
Lesbian and gay activists hoped to take advantage of the Charter's 
potentially inclusive language. The Empire State Pride Agenda ("ESPA"), 
the most prominent state-wide lesbian and gay political organization, 
worked to create a lesbian and gay district in the West Village-Chelsea 
area of M a n h ~ t t a n . ~ ~  Retmrrs from primaries and deetisns that ineluded 
openly gay candidates formed the principal evidence for the creation of 
a West Village-Chelsea district by demonstrating the existence of an iden- 
tifiable population of  supporter^.^^ Maps showing the locations of institu- 
tions such as bookstores, bars, and community organizations suggested 
the density of the lesbian and gay population.loO An analysis of a 34,000- 
person mailing list of contributors to lesbian and gay institutions organ- 
ized by zip code suggested that the concentration of lesbian and gay 
donors was five times higher in Chelsea and the West Village than in the 
rest of Manhattan.lol Manhattan activists could thus draw a geographically 
compact line around this concentration of lesbians and gay men. 
The creation of a gay and lesbian district in Manhattan thus required 
creative contortionism, as an amorphous lesbian and gay community was 
squeezed into district lines. This piecemeal pragmatism of alternate map- 
ping illustrates a districting system's inherent inability to satisfy lesbian 
and gay electoral needs. 
Ultimately, the Commission responded favorably by creating a les- 
bian and gay district in Manhattan.lo2 The Commission was unable to 
- - - - - 
g5See Hernandez, supra note 84. Both Robert Bailey, a consultant to the Commission, 
and Alan Gartner, the executive director of the Commission, confirmed this implication of 
the term. See Interview with Robert Bailey, supra note 57; GARTNER, supra note 88, at 
167. But cf: Frank Lynn, Seeking More Minority Council Members, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
1991, 9 1, at 32 (asserting that Republicans used the term "other" to base a claim to 
representation on the Council). 
g6A district is compact when its borders are as close as possible to a central point so 
that the shape is easily identifiable. Gerrymandering is often viewed as the opposite of 
compactness because gerrymandered districts often have bizarre shapes. See Dillard v. 
Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1460 (h4.D. Ala. 1988) (explaining the 
reasons for the emphasis on compactness). 
g7See CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 52(l)(d)-(g) (as amended Dec. 31, 
1989). 
g8See Lynn, supra note 95. 
991d.; see GARTNER, supra note 88, at 133. 
'OOGARTNER, supra note 88, at 133. Accepting lesbian and gay institutions as an 
unmediated proxy for locating lesbian and gay communities, however, dissewes lesbians 
and gay men who use these institutions without residing near them. 
lolId.; testimony by Richard Dadey, supra note 55 (presenting data gathered by the 
media group Stmb-Dawson). 
1021nitially, the district divided the community at Christopher Street. However, by 
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create a majority-minority district in the West Village-Chelsea area be- 
cause of the relatively low percentage of African Americans and Latinos. 
It could therefore take "other" factors into consideration and fashion a 
district organized around sexual orientation. 
The ability of Manhattan lesbian and gay advocates to develop a 
working relationship with other minority communities contributed greatly 
to the creation of a lesbian and gay district.lo3 Lesbian and gay advocates 
met with leaders of other minority communities to assuage any fears that 
a lesbian and gay district would be created at the expense of an ethnic or 
racial minority district.lo4 In particular, an alliance between lesbian and 
gay advocates and Asian American leaders ensured that district lines 
would be drawn in a way that empowered both communities.105 
The West Village-Chelsea community is perhaps the most powerful 
lesbian and gay community in New York City.lo6 It now provides the sole 
direct representation for lesbian and gay New Yorkers in the City Council 
and New York State Legislature, and it elects what many consider to be 
the most progressive seat in the'united States House of Representatives.lo7 
Through a series of primary votes and the election of New York's first 
openly lesbian state representative, the lesbian and gay community in this 
area established itself as an organized, well-financed political constituency.los 
Even though Manhattan advocates received a district resembling their 
goal, the process by which that district was achieved demonstrates the 
difficulties faced by lesbians and gay men in the circuitous, hierarchical 
districting process. Similar problems were faced by residents of Brooklyn, 
who had a far more difficult time convincing the Commission to create a 
lesbian and gay district. Brooklyn advocates supported a district centered 
in Park Slope, the heart of Brooklyn's lesbian and gay community.109 
shifting boundaries increasingly southward, the Commission ultimately included the entire 
identifiable West Village-Chelsea lesbian and gay community. 
lo3See GARTNER, supra note 88, at 132. 
'"See Interview with Alan Gartner, Executive Director of New York City Districting 
Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 6, 1994). 
losSec Richard Dadey, Address to the Districting Commission (Mar. 27, 1991) (on file 
with author). An alliance between gay and lesbian advocates and the Asian American 
community headed off a last-minute clash with the supporters of the multiethnic China- 
town proposal. GARTNER, supra note 88, at 134. But cf: Yoko Yoshikawa, The Heat is On 
Miss Saigor~ Coalition: Organizing Across Race and Sexuality, in THE STATE OF ASIAN 
AMERICA: ACTIVIS~I AND RESISTANCE IN THE 1990s 275 (Karin Aguillar-San Juan ed., 
1994) (describing clash between gay and straight Asian American activists and Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund). 
lo6For an especially rich source of lesbian and gay history in New York, see GEORGE 
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK (1994). 
lo7 See, e.g., Terry Golway. Nadle~ Duane in "Heartbreak" Race for Affections of West 
Side Liberals, N.Y. OBSERVER, May 30, 1994, at 1 (describing West Side Democrats as 
"famed for sending the very purest of pure liberals to Capitol Hill"). 
lo8See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 84. 
lo9See Norimitsu Onishi, In a Gay Haven, a Sense of Community Builds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 1994, 9 13, at 9. 
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While nonelectoral information served merely as supporting evidence of 
the concentration of lesbians and gay men in Manhattan, it was the 
primary evidence relied on by activists in Brooklyn, who lacked the 
electoral records available to Manhattan advocates.l1° Further, the pro- 
posed lesbian and gay district cut through several incumbent strongholds 
and minority cornm~nities."~ As a result, the Commission completely 
ignored the Brooklyn proposal and split Park Slope into three districts.l12 
The Commission eliminated the opportunity for lesbians and gay men 
from this area to elect a representative of their choice by fracturing their 
voting strength among several districts. 
Many lesbians and gay men focused on the apparent end of their 
electoral exile and lauded the Commission's work, despite the fact that 
only one district out of fifty-one was designed to elect a candidate sup- 
porting lesbian and gay interests. Pleased with the possibility that they 
would gain some representation, many lesbians and gay men ignored their 
unrealized potential. However, Outweek-then the largest circulation maga- 
zine for lesbian and gay readers in New York-criticized the Commis- 
sion's efforts.l13 Another response to the plan noted that no one on the 
Commission was lesbian or gay and commented that the Commission's 
composition hurt the general lesbian and gay effort.lI4 
The limitations of the redistricting process in New York City reveal 
the myriad problems that a districting system poses for the representation 
of lesbian and gay interests. The undemocratic, top-down representation 
fixed by the fifteen-member Commission, the distorting population deter- 
minations required by that Commission, and the ultimate disappointment 
of Brooklyn's lesbian and gay voters exposes the failures of districting 
for lesbian and gay communities in their search for representation. 
"Osee Kysella, supra note 28, at 255-56; see also Testimony by George Waffle before 
the New York City Districting Commission (Feb. 20, 1991) (on file with author). 
ll1Testimony by George Waffle before the Districting Commission (May 7, 1991) (on 
file with author). The fact that lesbians and gay men could not assert themselves in 
Brooklyn, where more blacks and Latinos lived, demonstrates lesbian and gay interest 
subordination to ethnic and racial minority interests. 
l12The division of Park Slope was intended, in part, to create a Latino district. 
However, Brooklyn's 20% Latino population was so dispersed that it only received one 
safe district out of 17. Brooklyn's Latinos, like Latinos citywide, are far less concentrated 
than African Americans in New York City. See Jack Newfield, Hidden Agendas Ruled, 
Council Gerrymandered, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1991, at 10. 
l13The Case of the Missing Districts, OUTWEEK, May 1, 1991, at 4 (arguing that since 
lesbians and gay men constituted 10% of New York's population, they deserved at least 
five seats on the City Council). 
l14See, e.g., Testimony by George Waffle before the New York City Districting 
Commission (May 29, 1991) (on file with author). 
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III. Empowerment of Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Proportional 
Representation 
A. An Overview of Proportional Representation 
From 1937 to 1945, New York's City Council was elected propor- 
tionally by borough. Called by some the "Golden Age of the City Coun- 
cil,"l15 the diversity of political affiliation, from Communists to Republi- 
cans, fostered vigorous debate among the elected representatives.l16 By 
permitting people to unify around their interests rather than being divided 
by location, a proportional system could rekindle the kind of broad debate 
that once flourished and include lesbian and gay interests in that debate. 
In proportional representation systems, seats are apportioned to can- 
didates or parties in relation to the votes that the candidates or parties 
receive. Voters collectively elect several representatives on a jurisdiction- 
wide basis.l17 Since the winning candidates need only meet a threshold of 
votes to be elected-the size of which varies in inverse proportion to the 
number of representatives in a jurisdiction-a voter has more candidates 
from which to choose and is far more likely to actually elect a candidate 
with her vote.l18 Unlike in single-member districts, where the voters in 
one specific area elect one representative, voters in proportional systems 
can unite exclusively around  interest^."^ With fewer geographic divisions, 
voters can choose how to form their constituencies within a jurisdicti~n. '~~ 
"SMartin Gottlieb, The 'Golden Age'of the City Council, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1991, 
§ 4, at 6. 
116Id. While the last proportional election in 1945 led to the Council's 65% Demo- 
cratic majority, the composition of the Council was skewed even more heavily in favor of 
Democrats in 1949-two years after the system was voted out by referendum. At that time, 
Democrats won 24 of the Council's 25 seats. Id. 
"'The fact that proportional representation is not a majority rule system distinguishes 
it from multimember, at-large districting-another jurisdiction-wide system. In a mul- 
timember, at-large jurisdiction, a group of representatives is elected by a majority of voters 
jurisdiction-wide. As in proportional representation, each voter in the jurisdiction votes for 
all of the seats. However, because multimember at-large contests are won by simple 
majorities, even significant minorities can be subjugated, unlike under proportional repre- 
sentation. Guinier, No nvo Seats, supra note 16, at 1461-64. 
11sSee Inman, supra note 28, at 2004. The threshold for election-that is, the 
minimum percentage of votes that a candidate must receive in order to win--differs 
depending on the proportional system and the number of seats, candidates, and voters. The 
crucial variable in all proportional systems is the number of seats: the higher the number 
of seats, the lower the threshold for election. Id. at 2001 n.38 ('With one vote for each 
voter in a nine-member district, for example, any candidate who receives at least one vote 
more than one-tenth of the votes cast is sure of election."). 
"')Even under proportional representation, some single-member jurisdictions would 
exist. For example, the six states that currently elect only one representative to the House 
of Representatives would remain single-member districts under a proportional system. See 
Inman, supra note 28, at 2005 n.60. 
120Large jurisdictions would need to be subdivided to make elections manageable. See 
id. at 2005 n.59. California, for example, might be divided into three divisions, each 
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A representative is therefore bound by her constituency's beliefs rather 
than by its location. 
One distinct advantage of proportional representation over districting 
is that the sharp increase in voting power for all individuals weakens 
majority rule and empowers minorities. In a direct election for a single 
candidate, the majority of votes may be wasted-that is, they may not 
lead to the election of a candidate-if several candidates split the vote.121 
Under a proportional system, if there are ten seats up for election, the 
threshold for election is the percentage of votes attained by the candidate 
who ranks tenth. Because the threshold for election is far smaller than 
that under majority rule, there are fewer wasted votes. Proportional rep- 
resentation translates a far greater number of votes into the election of a 
candidate. 
Proportional representation also empowers minority communities to 
a greater extent than a districting system. Under districting, the support 
of a majority or even a plurality of voters suffices for complete victory. 
For example, if each of Texas's representatives in Congress were elected 
by slight majorities of 51%, a full 49% of voting Texans would constitute 
an unrepresented minority in a districting system. In a proportional sys- 
tem, however, the election would take place in multimember districts or 
statewide, with a far smaller population excluded from powersharing. 
Although a proportional system preserves the ability of a group that 
constitutes a majority to exercise its power, that majority does not succeed 
to the exclusion of minorities. 
B. Forms of Proportional Representation 
There are several types of proportional representation, the most sig- 
nificant of which are the single transferable vote ("STV"), list propor- 
tional representation, and cumulative voting.122 Under the STY the system 
currently used in the New York City School Board elections, each voter 
electing 17 representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives. Such a system would 
still permit far broader representation than districting because the threshold for election 
would be under six percent of the vote. 
121This situation occurred in the 1992 presidentid election, when approximately 57% 
of the voters did not vote for the winning candidate. See Robin Toner, Clinton Captures 
Presidency with Huge Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress, N.Y. Tmr~s, Nov. 
4, 1992, at A1 (stating that Bill Clinton gamered 43% of the vote; George Bush, 38%; 
and Ross Perot, 18%). 
122Because other scholarship thoroughly describes these different systems, this Article 
will not explore differences in any great detail. See, e.g., Edward Still, Alternatives to  
Single-Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 68, at 249 (summariz- 
ing a broad range of voting systems that might substitute for a single-member district 
system). For a description of cumulative voting, see Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra 
note 59, at 1632-33 (advocating cumulative voting). See also Inman, supra note 28, at 
1999-2002 (describing STV); John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of Pro- 
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ranks a list of candidates by preference. If a voter's first choice candidate 
has already received enough votes to win a seat, her vote is transferred 
to her second choice, or the following choice, until all seats are filled. 
This system wastes the fewest votes.123 Because each voter chooses sev- 
eral candidates, the likelihood that a voter's vote will propel a candidate 
to victory is higher. However, the high number of candidates and the 
complexity of choice and vote calculation in an STV election can make 
the system highly ~0nfus ing . l~~  
The second type of proportional representation is list proportional 
representation. Under this system, which is commonly used in Europe, a 
party receives a number of seats relative to the percentage of votes re- 
ceived by the party.125 The party in turn determines who will serve in the 
government. The principal drawback to this system is exemplified by its 
use in Italy, where shifting coalitions based on party loyalty have led to 
regular government c01lapses.l~~ A second, often noted, disadvantage of 
this system is that it transfers power from the voter to the party, which 
can lead to the existence of a strengthened elite. 
Under the third proportional representation system-cumulative vot- 
ing--each voter receives one vote for each seat up for e1ecti0n.l~~ For 
example, in a state with five congressional seats, each resident would have 
five votes to divide among the candidates seeking the seats.12* Some voters 
might vote several times for one candidate, emphasizing their preference 
and permitting an underrepresented or unrepresented community to attain 
portior~al Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 186 n.107 (1984) (discussing list proportional 
representation). 
Iz3See Inman, supra note 28, at 2048; Alexander A. Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right 
to Vote ~vitli the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1810, 1864-65 (1992). 
lZ4STV proportional representation is accused of fostering confusion because the voter 
does not know which of her votes will actually count. During the 1993 School Board 
elections in New York City, many remarked upon the complexity of the system. See 
Interview with Thomas K. Duane, New York City Council Member, in New York, N.Y. 
(Dec. 31, 1993). 
Iz5See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U .  PA. 
L. REV. 801. 846-47 11.151 (1993) (comparing the German, Israeli, and Italian proportional 
systems); Flora Lewis, Europe Sl~ops for a Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1991, 9 1, at 
23 (describing the party-list system in Europe). 
126Alan Cowell. Italians Vote: Can Thev Start a Political Revival?, N.Y. TIMES,  AD^. 
- 
19, 1993, at AS. 
'27Cumulative voting is commonly used for corporate board elections. ROBERT C. 
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 361-66 (1986) (explaining the use and mechanics of cumulative 
voting in corporate elections). 
128The minimum number of votes needed to win a seat can be calculated using the 
formula N = [V I (R+l)] + 1, where N is the minimum number of necessary votes, V 
is the number of voters, and R is the number of available slots. See Guinier, Emperor's 
Clothes, supra note 59, at 1633 n.170. In states with large congressional delegations, 
smaller divisions might be created to simplify voters' Choices. Although such multimember 
jurisdictions do insert some geographical interests into proportional systems, the influence 
of geography is weaker than in a single-member districting system. 
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representation. Cumulative voting thus provides for greater minority em- 
powerment in comparison with other proportional systems by permitting 
even smaller minority groups to achieve representation through vote con- 
centration. Under this system, lesbian and gay voters could elect larger 
numbers of representatives by concentrating their votes. 
Although each of the above proportional representation systems ad- 
dresses the key flaws of districting-that it is geographically based and 
majority-ruled-cumulative voting would be the most effective of the 
three systems in improving lesbian and gay interest representation. First, 
a voter in a cumulative system has the opportunity to vote for several 
candidates and can therefore give voice to her full range of political 
interests. This aspect of the system may improve minority interest repre- 
sentation, including that of lesbians and gay men, by permitting those 
with strong ties to a particular cause to vote several times for one candi- 
date. Second, as it permits all voters to voice several political interests, 
cumulative voting would allow for the expression of lesbian and gay 
intersectionality. If an African American lesbian wanted to vote for an 
African American candidate as well as for a lesbian candidate, she could 
do so. .Third, under districting and noncumulative proportional systems, 
lesbians and gay men who are politically committed to other issues might 
not vote for a lesbian or gay candidate, whereas a cumulative system 
would permit a marginally lesbian- or gay-identified person to exhibit 
some support for lesbian and gay interests. Expression of the full range 
of lesbian and gay identities would r e~u1 t . l~~  
C. Effective Representation of Lesbian and Gay Interests Under 
Proportional Systems 
Proportional representation would dejnitely consolidate our vot- 
ing strength and be more representative of our true 
Given the lesbian and gay representational characteristics already 
discussed,131 lesbians and gay men would benefit from a proportional 
system. First, proportional representation does not require that a group be 
officially identifiable. Political positions rather than places of residence 
determine repre~entati0n.l~~ As a result, lesbian and gay voters jurisdic- 
tion-wide could vote for those candidates most suited to their needs; 
lZ9One might argue that an STV system, in which voters rank candidates by prefer- 
ence, would equally permit such intersectional voting. However, only one of the ranked 
candidates under such a system ultimately receives the voter's vote. 
1301nte~iew ith Richard Dadey, supra note 9. 
l3l See supra part I.B. 
132See, e.g., Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1634. 
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identification and demographic difficulties would not impede effective 
interest representation. 
Lesbians and gay men with intersectional identities would be espe- 
cially well-represented under a proportional representation system. Poor 
lesbians and gay men would not be excluded from representation merely 
because they could not afford to live in expensive gay neighborhoods. 
Also, the more dispersed residential patterns of lesbians would not under- 
cut the effective representation of lesbian interests. Proportional repre- 
sentation, by emphasizing the power of the vote over that of geography, 
would directly provide all lesbians and gay men with an incentive to 
engage in electoral politics. 
For those lesbian and gay communities located outside of urban 
centers, proportional representation is the only effective way to represent 
the interests of their members. Under a districting system, such interests 
are not represented since their members are too dispersed to constitute a 
majority or even an influence district. Under proportional representation, 
however, even members of suburban lesbian and gay communities might 
attain interest representation. For example, if Florida adopted proportional 
representation for its congressional delegation, members of lesbian and 
gay communities from Key West, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale could unite 
to attain interest representation as part of that delegation. 
Moreover, lesbians and gay men who exhibit a higher-than-average 
registration rate and voter turnout in their jurisdictions would be rewarded 
under a proportional representation system.133 In such a system, voter 
turnout is the most relevant factor in a candidate's election. The 1993 New 
York City School Board elections, in which a proportional system enabled 
candidates representing lesbian and gay interests to achieve an overwhelm- 
ing victory,13j illustrate the power of the lesbian and gay community to 
vote when threatened.135 
133Statistics from the early 1980s indicate that while 17% of San Francisco's popula- 
tion is lesbian and gay, "[b]ecause of their age, level of education, and militancy, gays 
represent about 25% of registered voters, and in decisive elections, their high turnout may 
approach 30% of the voters:' CASTELLS, supra note 40, at 138. The opposite phenomenon 
afflicts communities of color, where 65% is often used as the minimum population 
necessary to constitute a majority-minority district because of low voter participation. See 
Ketchum v. Byme, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the 65% rule 
results from the addition of 5% for lower registration, 5% for lower turnout at the polls, 
and 5% for the relative youth of the minority population to a simple 50% majority). Voting 
rights literature often addresses this ''rule.'' See, e.g., K i b a l l  Brace et al., Minorify Voting 
Equality: The 65% Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 LAW & POL'Y 43 (1988); Frank R. 
Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE 
DILUTION, supra note 68, at 108-11. Without "hard data," it would be difficult to 
determine the electoral strength of lesbians and gay men of color. 
134See supra pp. 1 4 ,  see also Sam Dillon, Nav York Cify's 32 School Boards Get 
New Faces but Not New Views, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at Al. The Board of Elections 
uses the single transferable vote. See Gottlieb, supra note 115. 
135Sam Dillon, "Light" School Board Vote Was Really the Heaviest Ever, N.Y. TIMES, 
Heinonline - -  31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 144 1996 
19961 Lesbian and Gay Proportional Representation 145 
Under a proportional system, the number of lesbian and gay repre- 
sentatives would still be small compared to that of heterosexual repre- 
sentatives. Furthermore, representatives would still face problems such as 
those confronting black and Latino legislators, whose voices have been 
weakened by procedural sleights of hand.136 Nevertheless, proportional 
voting would advance lesbian and gay interest representation. Increased 
numbers and greater possibilities for coalition building would motivate 
other representatives to deal with lesbian and gay colleagues and interests 
on a daiiy basis.137 
Perhaps most important, the symbolic value of lesbian and gay inter- 
est representation would provide lesbian and gay communities with po- 
litical self-respect. Included in the political process, lesbians and gay men 
would feel less alienated and would express their interests within the 
system rather than through more radical means. Lesbian and gay electoral 
success under a proportional system might encourage other minorities to 
participate in the political process, especially under a cumulative voting 
system. 
Under proportional representation, campaigns would face challenging 
transformations because they would be more geographically extensive 
than under districting. Broader coalition building among lesbian and gay 
communities would be necessary in order to win jurisdiction-wide elec- 
tions. Well-heeled lesbian and gay urban communities might help fund 
candidates who could be elected with suburban as well as urban votes. 
The challenges to lesbian and gay political strategists would be great 
because they would have to determine both how to organize diverse 
communities to get out votes and how to conduct a jurisdiction-wide 
media campaign.138 But even in a state like Horida, where lesbian and gay 
communities are less organized than those in New York and California, 
such a campaign might well succeed. Access to representation for lesbians 
and gay men from suburban and rural areas might increase their partici- 
pation ia the political process, bring them toward the center of lesbian 
and gay politics, and even motivate them to organize their own cam- 
p a i g n ~ . ' ~ ~  
May 19, 1993, at A1 (quoting Jon Nalley) ("The gay community felt very threatened by 
the Catholic Church's alliance with the Pat Robertson types, and gays felt really called 
upon to go to the polls."). In response to this call, total votes in the West Village-Chelsea 
district quadrupled. Id. 
136See generally Guinier, Single-Member Districts, supra note 31, at 1152-53 (dis- 
cussing third-generation voting rights cases, which center on discrimination against 
minority representatives designed to prevent them from significantly affecting legislatures). 
137George Waffle, Address to the Districting Commission (May 7, 1991) (on file with 
author). 
138Strategists already balance the complexities of running for office as a lesbian or 
gay candidate. See generally GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, supra note 4. 
139For front-line perspectives on running for office as an openly lesbian or gay 
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D. Arguments Against Proportional Representation 
Several objections are often raised in response to suggestions to 
implement proportional representation. First, proportional representation 
is often criticized for ignoring local interests.140 However, under propor- 
tional representation, voters would still be able to organize and elect 
representatives based on local interest~'~+eography would be one among 
many possible proxies for interest. Defining the representative's constitu- 
ency by interest would thus maintain activism around local issues. 
Critics also argue that proportional representation would deprive the 
representative of the ability to consult a concrete constit~ency. '~~ To the 
contrary, a representative would have a clearer political position because 
her supporters would be politically unified.143 The legislator would be 
liberated from constant polling to determine which position appeals to the 
most voters. Rather, she would be compelled to vote consistently for 
positions taken during her campaign. In this respect, proportional repre- 
sentation would lead to fuller debates on all issues between legislators 
with unified political constituencies. 
Another major criticism of proportional representation is that, by 
preventing simple majorities from ruling, it would subvert fundamental 
democratic principles. However, the government's legitimacy derives not 
simply from the consent of the majority but from that of all people. In 
addition, the lower percentage of wasted votes would make proportional 
candidate outside of lesbian and gay population centers, see Dale McCormick, Running in 
a Rural District, in GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, supra note 4, at 223 and Irene 
Rabinowitz, Rurinirig in a Small Town, in GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, supra note 
4, at 219. 
I4OAlan Gartner, the executive director of the New York City Districting Commission, 
has stated: 
If there's any validity to geographic representation, it is in local government. I 
would be more interested in thinking about proportional representation for other 
than local government, federal or maybe state government. The kinds of issues 
that a congressmember deals with have really very little to do with basic 
geographic proximity . . . . [Gliven the size of districts except in minority areas, 
they cover such a diversity, that it's difficult to say that there's one interest. 
Interview with Alan Gartner, supra note 104; see also Peter H .  Schuck, The Thickest 
Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1325, 1371-72 (1987). But see Inman, supra note 28, at 2016-18 (summarizing and 
countering geographic and local interest criticisms of proportional representation). 
14lSee Guinier, No T,vo Seats, supra note 16, at 1473 ("[Ilnterest representation 
generates incentives for community-based organizations to play a more active role in 
mobilizing the electorate and monitoring the legislature by both protecting and ratifying 
authentic representatives."). 
142Id. (countering the arguments of opponents of proportional representation). 
143See Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1638 (arguing that proportional 
representation "restores the link between representation and voting by ensuring that 
legislators represent unanimous, not divided, constituencies"). 
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representation an especially effective system for representative democ- 
racy. 
Proportional representation would also enhance democracy because 
each vote in a jurisdiction would have equal weight. Although the Su- 
preme Court has clearly required almost exact population equality among 
districts, vast inequalities in voting participation rates among districts 
significantly weaken the effectiveness of this requirement. For example, 
if District A has a 40% voting rate and District B has an 80% voting rate, 
the voters in District A have votes that are iwice as powerfd 8s those In 
District B-because fewer votes are required to win an election. Districts 
with lower participation rates receive as much representation as districts 
with high rates, leading to the same inequality that propelled the Supreme 
Court to reject Alabama's apportionment scheme in Reynolds v. S i r n ~ . ' ~ ~  
Under a proportional system, on the other hand, representation would 
depend on actual votes rather than on district lines that dilute some votes 
and fortify others.145 Proportional representation would express demo- 
cratic ideals by allowing an individual's level of interest to determine her 
own role in the political process. 
Many critics contend that proportional representation would create 
instability by emphasizing minority interests.146 Others assert that the 
two-party system, the bulwark of majority rule, is necessary for stabil- 
ity.147 However, the current districting system itself encourages instability. 
The top-down organization of representation along racial and ethnic lines, 
required by the Voting Rights Act, has drawn fire for "balkanizing" leg- 
i s l a t u r e ~ . ~ ~ ~  Furthermore, districting divides many communities by draw- 
ing lines around and through them. The stability of majority rule is thus 
a false one based on the loss of voting power of a significant part of the 
e1e~torate.l~~ Proportional representation, by contrast, would embrace the 
opinions of a far broader population of voters. The incorporation of such 
diverse perspectives would increase voter participation, which would in 
turn discourage extrasystemic political actions such as terrorism and riot- 
144377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court objected to the fact that districts varied in 
population, thus weighting the votes of some citizens over others. In a proportional system, 
the only inequity in the value of a vote occurs when a candidate has won by slightly 
passing the threshold, and the votes she received are more important to her than those 
received by a candidate who easily passed the threshold. However, such inequity exists in 
any election system. 
1451d. at 535. 
146See, e-g., Inman, supra note 28, at 2020-21 (countering the arguments of a wide 
range of opponents of proportional representation); see also Peter J .  Taylor, The Case for 
Proportional Tenure: A Defense of the British Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELEC- 
TORAL SYSTEM 53, 57 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984). 
147See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
148See Balkanizing the City Council, N.Y. POST, June 7, 1991, at 34. 
149See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT I  
LAW AND POLITICS 49 (1968). 
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ing. Thus, proportional representation would encourage stability without 
undermining local interests. 
IV. The Legal and Political Challenges of Implementing a Proportional 
System 
However clear it may be that proportional representation would greatly 
improve lesbian and gay interest representation-as well as that of all 
voters-such a change cannot be enacted without first overcoming legal 
and political obstacles. 
A. Tlze Questionable Legal Status of Proportional Representation 
Those arguing for the institution of proportional representation face 
the ambivalence of the current law toward proportional remedies. The 
Voting Rights Act neither mandates nor prohibits such remedies.150 None- 
theless, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act as well as subsequent Supreme Court cases indicate that 
proportional systems are disfavored.lS1 Furthermore, even certain liberal 
Supreme Court Justices have conceded that an interpretation of the Voting 
Rights Act that required proportional representation would turn the Court 
into a super-legislature.lS2 
Voting rights scholars, however, argue that the Court could interpret 
case law and statutes to require a remedy that institutes proportional 
representation.lS3 Guinier has asserted that the requirements of sections 2 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act would be most effectively met by a system 
of proportional representation that allowed minority communities to have 
their interests repre~ented. '~~ Inman argues further that because the Su- 
'SO42 U.S.C. 5 1973(b) ("[Nlothing . . . establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."). 
'SlThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36 (1986) (recognizing that the Voting Rights 
Act does not provide for proportional remedies); S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
94 (1982). reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 364 (additional views of Senator Robert 
Dole) ("It was generally agreed that the concept of certain identifiable groups having a 
right to be elected in proportion to their voting potential was repugnant to the democratic 
principles upon which our society is based:'). 
ISzSee, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 123 (Marshall, I., dissenting) 
(acknowledging the majority's criticism of a proportional representation requirement). 
153111 fact, at least one court has ordered a jurisdiction to adopt a proportional 
representation system as a remedy to a Voting Rights Act violation. See Cane v. Worcester 
County, 847 F. Supp. 369 (Md. 1994). aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 
1994) (remanding for consideration of county-proffered remedy). 
154See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1493-1513. Indeed, in Holder v. Hall, 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that nothing in the Voting Rights Act 
affirmatively prohibits courts from instituting proportional representation systems as 
remedies to Voting Rights Act violations. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2601 (1994) 
(Thomas, J., concumng) (characterizing districting systems as "merely political choices" 
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preme Court has recognized that representation based on group identity 
already serves as a baseline for fair districtinglS5-despite the cautionary 
language of the Voting Rights Act-proportional representation is a better 
solution for voting rights discri~nination.~~~ This recognition of group 
remedies for voting rights discrimination within the Court's jurisprudence 
suggests that proportional representation could obtain judicial approval. 
B. The Inability of Lesbian and Gay Communities to Institute 
Proportional Representation Single-Handedly 
The unprecedented leap by lesbians and gay men onto the American 
political stage has been accompanied by heterosexist reactionary forces 
that impede lesbian and gay progress. The inclusion of lesbian and gay 
interests in the Clinton campaign, the attempted reversal of the ban on 
lesbians and gay men in the military, and the appointment of an openly 
lesbian politician to an upper-level cabinet position demonstrate a hereto- 
fore unseen prominence of lesbian and gay interests.lS7 Although wide- 
spread Republican victories in the 1994 congressional elections fore- 
shadow continued congressional homophobia,1ss two antigay initiatives 
were defeated, and twenty-four lesbian or gay officials reelected or newly 
elected to 0 f f i ~ e . l ~ ~  Nevertheless, as lesbian and gay community organiz- 
ing has grown, so have antigay forces.160 Where rights have been won by 
lesbian and gay men, referenda sponsored by the Christian Right have 
succeeded in limiting such ~ ic t0 r ies . l~~  h this climate, it seems highly 
unlikely that the nation-or any state or locality for that matter-would 
that "may fall under suspicion of havrng a dilutive effect on minority voting strength" in 
violation of the Voting Rights Act). 
155Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) ("[Nleither we nor the district 
courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable 
population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength 
of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of 
proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State."). 
156See generally Inman, supra note 28. 
157See Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Confirm Achtenberg; Californian Will Take HUD 
Post as First Openly Lesbian Ojjicial, WASH. POST, May 25, 1993, at A7. 
lS8See, e.g., Jerry Gray, Gingrich Criticized for Opposing Job Protection for Homo- 
sexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A19. But see Frank Rich, Closet Clout, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 1995, at A23 (arguing that because it is unlikely that the Christian Right will vote 
for Democrats, the GOP should woo lesbian and gay swing.voters). 
lS9David W. Dunlap, Gay Politicians Cite Gains Amid Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
1994, at B9 (quoting Sheila James Kuehl, newly elected California state representative). 
160See Jeffrey Schmalz, Homosexuals Wake to See a Referendum: It's on Them, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, 8 4, at 1. 
'6'In the wake of the passage of CoIorado's referendum Amendment 2, which would 
prohibit the extension of civil rights protections to lesbians and gay men, many states and 
localities have already approved or will soon vote on similar antigay referenda. For the 
perspective of two openly gay and lesbian elected officials on opposing the Christian 
Right, see Glen Maxey, Running Against the Right, in GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, 
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reform its electoral system for the express purpose of improving lesbian 
and gay interest representation. Attaining proportional representation will 
require a far broader political movement, one that includes other minority 
groups as well as the general electorate. 
V. Realizing Proportional Representation 
A. The Miller (D)evolutioiz: Erasing Minority Electoral Empowerment 
The 1995 Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Johnson162 has pro- 
foundly transformed the law of districting. The Court based its holding 
on Shaw v. Reno,163 in which it found that a majority-African American 
district in North Carolina "stigmatized" white pe0p1e.l~~ Adopting the 
SItaw Court's holding, the Miller Court held that "a plaintiff states a claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a state redistricting 
plan, on its face, has no rational explanation save as an effort to separate 
voters on the basis of race."165 In Miller, the Court held that a Georgia 
congressional district created predominantly to empower African Ameri- 
cans was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.166 
With the establishment of a Shaw claim, the Court may have spawned 
a new generation of voting rights litigation unlike that of the previous 
three  generation^.'^^ As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Miller, 
"[tlhe Court attempts an explanation in these cases by equating the injury 
it imagines respondents have suffered with the injuries African Americans 
supra note 4, at 159; Gail Shibley, Corning Out on Every Doorstep, in GAY AND LESBIAN 
VICTORY FUND, supra note 4, at 91. 
16* 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). 
163 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
'"Id. at 2818. 2824. 
16sMiller. 115 S. Ct. at 2475. 
166Id. The principal evidence for the majority was that race served as the only common 
characteristic among the residents of this not-so-irregular district. This lack of significant 
irregularity is noted by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. See id. at 2502-03 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
167The term "generation" merely denotes the establishment of a new kind of voting 
rights litigation; it does not indicate progress. The first generation of voting rights 
litigation concerned the attempt to attain the right to vote for all African Americans. See, 
e.g., Terry v. Adams. 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that a Democratic primary that 
functioned as an election and excluded African Americans violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). The second generation focused on the right to representation in legislatures. See, 
e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding that a North Carolina districting 
scheme violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). The third generation involved efforts 
to oppose legislative rule changes that were designed to prevent minority elected officials 
from affecting public policy. See, e.g., Rojas v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., No. V-87-16, 
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11049 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989) 
(holding that a school board's action did not violate the Voting Rights Act when, after a 
Mexican American woman was elected, the board changed its rules to require the support 
of two members to put an issue before the board). 
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suffered under segregati~n."'~~ In this fourth generation of voting rights 
litigation, the goal, rather than preventing new forms of discrimination 
against minorities, would be to prevent "reverse discrimination" against 
whites in majority-African American districts. The harm against whites 
suggested by Shaw has developed into an equal protection claim before 
the Court, opening the door for all white residents in majority-minority 
districts to sue.169 If the district's formation has been primarily based on 
race, white residents would likely win, forcing districting bodies across 
the muntry to weaken African Americar, repeseotatim. 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent reveals the potentially ironic results of the 
Miller decision: 
If Chinese Americans and Russian Americans may seek and 
secure group recognition in the delineation of voting districts, 
then African Americans should not be dissimilarly treated. Oth- 
erwise, in the name of equal protection, we would shut out "the 
very minority group whose history in the United States gave 
birth to the Equal Protection 
Had Justice Ginsburg added lesbians and gay men to the list of groups 
permitted to influence districting, she would have described a possible 
reversal of the power balance between the lesbian and gay communities 
and the African American communities during the New York redistricting 
process. Miller restricts the use of race in the redistricting process; the 
decision does not restrict the use of sexual orientation in drawing district 
lines.17' 
B. The Potential of Minority Coalition Building 
Coalitions between lesbians and gay men and other minorities, who 
could benefit from the conversion to a proportional system in the wake 
of Miller, could serve as an effective path toward realizing proportional 
168MiIler, 115 S. Ct. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
l'j91ndeed, many such suits are already happening. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Suits 
Challenging Redrawn Districts That Help Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at A1 
(discussing the wave of suits challenging majority-minority districts since Shaw v. Reno). 
The changes in this domain of the law are only beginning, as the Supreme Court seems 
poised to further consider the voting rights issues raised in Shaw v. Reno. See Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Plan to Delve Anew lnto Race and Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 
- .  
11, 1993, $ 1, at 1. 
l7OMiller, 115 S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 
S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
I7l For a further elaboration of the effect of Miller on racial and sexual minorities, see 
Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming "Stigmas": Lesbian and Gay Districts and Black Elec- 
toral Empowerment, 39 How. L.J. (forthcoming, 1996). 
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representation.17* The Miller case and its interpretation of Shaw v. Reno 
are raising consciousness among African Americans and other minorities, 
who are now barely protected in a districting system by Voting Rights Act 
remedies. The ruling, which was handed down shortly after the 1994 
Republican congressional victories, has led to further dissatisfaction with 
electoral politics among African American~. '~~ Rising opposition to the 
race-conscious districting that created the district overturned in Shaw v. 
Reno might propel civil rights activists to support broader electoral changes 
that would encourage minority interest representation. Confronting prob- 
lems similar to those plaguing lesbians and gay men-packing and frac- 
turing, virtual representation, tokenism, and an array of other electoral 
disempowerment phenomena-such minorities may conclude that district- 
ing itself is not ultimately in their interests.174 Prominent African Ameri- 
cans have questioned the value of race-conscious districting for the ad- 
vancement of African American interests.'75 Dissatisfaction among f i c a n  
Americans only increased with widespread Democratic party losses in the 
1994 congressional elections176 and might well lead to a reconsideration 
of electoral structures.177 The new political realities indicate a profound 
exclusion of African Americans from the political system. Without hope 
172Huey P. Newton, the minister of defense for the Black Panther Party, described the 
beginning of such a coalition. See Huey P. Newton, A Letter from Huey E? Newton, COME 
OUT!, Sept.-Oct. 1970, at 12 (reprinting an internal letter from Huey P. Newton to the 
other brothers of the Black Panther Party). For a discussion of lesbian and gay participa- 
tion in minority movements, see MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) and JOHN 
D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES (1983). 
173See Isabel Wlkerson, Many Blacks See Betrayal in This Year's Campaign, N.Y. 
TIMES, NOV. 10, 1994, at B4. Some politicians and scholars argue that the creation of 
minority districts divided African Americans from liberal whites, facilitating Republican 
victories. See Steven A. Holmes, Did Racial Redistricting Undermine Democrats?, N.Y. 
TIMES, NOV. 13, 1994, 5 1, at 32; David Lublin, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
1994, at A28. 
174Indeed, as different minority communities grow and overlap geographically, they 
will find less protection in the Voting Rights Act and perhaps become more supportive of 
proportional representation alternatives. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empower- 
rrlenr: It's Not Just Black and White Any More, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 969-71, 975-77 
(1995) (arguing that no remedy exists under the Voting Rights Act when concurrent 
remedies for two different racial minority groups within a jurisdiction are mutually 
exclusive and proposing cumulative voting as a solution). 
175For example, Justice Clarence Thomas has criticized the enforcement of the Voting 
Rights Act, declaring that "we have devised a remedial mechanism that encourages federal 
courts to segregate voters into racially designated districts to ensure minority electoral 
success!' Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); Guinier, 
Single-Member Districts, supra note 31, at 1163 ("Where blacks and whites are geographi- 
cally separate, race-conscious districting by definition isolates blacks from potential white 
allies such as white women who are not geographically concentrated."). 
176See Wilkerson, supra note 173. 
177"The sense of alienation has renewed the debate over alternatives to the two-party 
system and the need [for blacks] to reach out to Hispanic, gay and other minority groups." 
Id. 
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for improvement of the status quo, African Americans might support such 
"radical" changes as proportional representation. 
The ability of lesbians and gay men to work with Asian Americans 
and other minorities in the New York redistricting process proves instruc- 
tive. This movement would certainly be furthered by a broader recognition 
of the limitations placed on racial minority representation by white ma- 
jorities within legislatures. Coalitions with racial, ethnic, and political 
minorities can occur locally in progressive jurisdictions and thereby ex- 
pand political debate.178 For example, lesbian and gay poPitiml aceivists 
might advocate for referenda or support litigation by protected minorities 
under the Voting Rights Act.179 The benefits of proportional remedies 
would not only enhance minority interest representation but would also 
expand such representation in all segments of the electorate. 
C. Eliminating Voter Discontent 
Profound voter discontent in recent years might also help overcome 
popular skepticism about proportional representation. In both the 1992 
and 1994 national elections, antigovernment discourse was a standard in 
both major parties and among independents.lsO Heightened interest in 
third-party or independent candidates reveals an electorate longing for 
alternatives,lS1 yet no force bolsters incumbency's inertia more than dis- 
tricting. Discouraged from uniting with others who agree with them, 
voters instead demand pork-barrel favors from their representatives. 
In a proportional system, all voters-not only lesbians and gay men- 
would be able to unite in dynamic ways. Proportional representation would 
liberate the political system from strongholds of incumbency fortified by 
each redistricting cycle. Tortured debate over third parties and independent 
candidates would become irrelevant, as candidates and parties would flourish 
to meet the demands of renewed voter activism.lS2 Voters would unite 
around many issues, shifting their allegiances to meet the demands of 
178For example, Republicans in New York City might gain from proportional repre- 
sentation, given their current minority position. Cf. Calvin Sims, For Council Winner, A 
Sign of Hope for Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B7. 
179See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1418 (suggesting that protected 
minority groups' success in restructuring voting rules will have a salutary effect on the 
political influence of other dispersed minorities). 
lS0Peter Applebome, Ideas and Trends: How the Union Joined the South, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 1994, $ 4, at 1. 
181See Keith D. Eisner, Non-Major-Party Candidates and Televised Presidential 
Debates: The Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U .  PA. L. REV. 973, 983 (1993) 
(discussing the role of third parties as policy innovators and their function generally in a 
two-party system); Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third 
Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J .  ON LEGIS. 167, 169 (1991) (arguing that third parties 
play a vital role in American politics and deserve ballot access). 
lS2Inman has argued that "by allowing more expression of the diverse components of 
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fresh political situations. A renaissance of democracy would result be- 
cause many more individuals would vote for the elected candidates. 
Conclusion 
After Deborah Glick, a representative from the West Village, spoke 
before the New York State Assembly in favor of a lesbian and gay civil 
rights bill as "a Jew, a woman, and a lesbian," she received a standing 
ovation from her fellow legislators.1g3 The Assembly subsequently passed 
the bill, supporting lesbian and gay rights legislation for the first time in 
its history.lR4 This victory, however, proved pyrrhic. Despite intensive 
lobbying for the bill's passage, the bill died in the New York Senate.lg5 
The Republican majority leadership refused to allow the bill to reach the 
floor, preventing the pro-gay Republican minority from joining with the 
Democratic minority for its passage. 
The frustration of lesbian and gay interests under districting not only 
heightens existing criticisms of the current system but also points toward 
an alternative system where representation will come from decision mak- 
ing by individual voters rather than from line drawing by political elites. 
In a proportional system, lesbians and gay men would form constituencies 
that candidates would court. In order to gain the votes of these active 
constituencies, representatives would advocate for the advancement of 
lesbian and gay interests. Neither party would be able to control the 
agenda or shut out vocal minorities completely. A broader range of inter- 
ests would therefore be represented. Debate would flourish throughout the 
nation's legislatures, giving advocates of lesbian and gay interests "a fair 
chance to influence the political process."1g6 
American society, a proportional representation system could lead to a significant renewal 
of political life within . . . election contests." Inman, supra note 28, at 2007. 
183Kevin Sack, Bill is Passed by Assembly on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, 
at B1. 
184 rd. 
Is5See Kevin Sack, Republicans Kill Measure on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
1993. 6 1. at 21. -   
ls6Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986). 
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